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1. Introduction
The global financial crisis provided a stark reminder that large falls in asset prices 
combined with high leverage can severely damage economies. In the United States, 
which has been at the core of the financial crisis, house prices declined by 
25–30  per cent between 2007 and 2009, ultimately contributing to the largest 
decline in economic activity in over 60 years. Global exposure to the US economy 
and a sharp decline in confidence was the catalyst for the first decline in global 
GDP in the post-War period. In addition, house price declines in Ireland, Spain and 
the United Kingdom contributed to a significant weakening of these economies. 
Given the scale of the damage, it is not surprising that these events have 
reinvigorated the long running debate about the role for policy in maintaining 
financial stability, including whether or how monetary policy should respond to 
changes in asset prices.1
While much of the earlier debate focused on identification of asset-price bubbles 
and whether monetary policy should respond to them, the debate appears to be 
shifting towards how policy should respond to financial imbalances more broadly. 
This reflects a growing recognition that asset price increases that are backed by a 
substantial rise in leverage and a less prudent approach to risk management by 
financial institutions can be dangerous. The global financial crisis has clearly 
demonstrated that a policy of ‘cleaning up the mess’ after a collapse in asset prices 
is problematic, especially if the collapse is associated with significant damage to 
financial institutions. This strengthens the case for taking earlier action in order to 
avoid a damaging correction later on. 
Nonetheless, there is much debate about the appropriate nature of the policy 
response along two broad strands. The first regards how much, if at all, monetary 
                                          
1  Issing (2009), Trichet (2009), Bernanke (2010), Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia and Mauro (2010) 
and Goodhart (2010). 2
policy should act to stem financial cycle upswings. The second, and closely related 
strand regards the scope for other policy instruments, such as so-called 
macroprudential tools. This paper suggests that there is a need to shift debate away 
from the extremes towards the question of the degree of policy intervention (or 
‘leaning’) that is appropriate and the mix of policies that is likely to be effective in 
maintaining stability of the macroeconomy. 
Understanding the effectiveness of the various approaches is, however, hindered 
by the limited experience of monetary or other policies being used explicitly to 
respond to financial imbalances.2 The few examples commonly cited include: 
Hong Kong in the early 1990s, with controls on loan-to-valuation ratios (LVRs); 
Spain’s adoption of dynamic provisioning from 2000; the response in Australia to 
rapid growth of house prices and credit between 2002 and 2004, with a 
combination of ‘open mouth operations’, a modest increase in policy rates and 
some regulatory actions; and the Swedish experience using a similar approach in 
response to rapid growth in house prices and credit between 2005 and 2007. 
This paper provides a detailed case study of the Australian experience in the early 
2000s.3 Between 1997 and late 2003, housing prices in Australia more than 
doubled, increasing by around 40 per cent over 2002 and 2003 alone. There was 
also a rapid increase in housing credit (of 20 per cent per annum in 2002 and 
2003), particularly for the purchase of residential investment properties. The boom 
ended in late 2003, with national housing prices broadly flat over the subsequent 
18 months (and falling in the two largest capital cities) and investor demand for 
residential property easing significantly. This turnaround is an example where a 
range of policies seemingly came together (albeit in a not explicitly coordinated 
fashion) to ‘lean against’ emerging imbalances at a time when the growth in 
residential property prices seemed inexorable. 
In the five years following the 2003 turnaround, dwelling prices grew at around the 
same pace as household disposable income and GDP growth averaged 3 per cent 
per annum. Indeed, the early shake-out of the housing market may be one reason 
why the Australian housing market and financial system were relatively well 
                                          
2 Indeed, Greenspan (2010) claims that: ‘There are no examples, to my knowledge, of a 
successful incremental defusing of a bubble that left prosperity in tact [sic]’ (p 45). 
3  This episode is covered briefly by Cecchetti (2006), Fatás et al (2009) and Posen (2009). 3
placed to weather the global financial crisis. Of course, the generally benign
outcome is also likely to have reflected a number of other factors. Among them, 
Australia benefited from a large rise in the terms of trade starting around the time 
that dwelling prices peaked. More generally, growth in the global economy was 
very strong over the period from 2003 to 2007. 
One important part of the policy response was a ‘public awareness campaign’ by 
the Reserve Bank, highlighting the risks to households and the economy if the 
existing trends in housing prices and borrowing continued (Macfarlane 2006). As 
part of this campaign, from mid 2002 there were an increasing number of ‘open 
mouth operations’ conducted by senior officials from the Reserve Bank. These 
public statements were widely reported in the media, and intensified during the 
period of most rapid growth in house prices. In addition, monetary policy was 
tightened over this period; in mid 2002 there were two 25 basis point increases, 
and then another two increases of the same amount in late 2003. While the 
increases reflected broader macroeconomic developments, they were accompanied 
by statements that expressed significant concern about the pace of credit growth 
and housing price inflation, which could fuel imbalances if sustained. 
During this episode, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 
publicly raised its concerns with banking institutions regarding housing lending 
standards and undertook a detailed stress test of their housing loan portfolios. The 
Australian Taxation Office (ATO) also took a stricter approach to enforcement of 
housing-related tax laws. In addition, authorities took action against what appeared 
to be fraudulent activity in the rapidly expanding property investment industry, 
exposing and prosecuting agents of a prominent ‘get-rich-quick’ scheme. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the post-
financial crisis debate on asset prices and monetary policy, and the literature on the 
policy responses to asset price upswings. Section 3 provides a brief history of 
Australia’s experience with cycles in credit and asset prices and discusses events in 
the Australian housing market in the early 2000s. Section 4 describes the range of 
policy measures put in place in Australia between 2002 and 2004 in response to 
rapid house price and credit growth, and examines the media response to the 
Reserve Bank’s public awareness campaign. Section 5 concludes. 4
2. Asset Prices, Monetary and Other Policies 
2.1 The Recent Debate 
The weight of opinion prior to the global financial crisis was that central banks 
should respond aggressively to the contractionary effects of sharp asset price falls 
but not respond directly to asset prices during upswings (Issing 2009).4 A 
prominent advocate of this view was Alan Greenspan (former Chairman of the US 
Federal Reserve System), who argued that identifying a bubble with a degree of 
certainty was not possible and that any pre-emptive policy response would likely 
be destabilising. Rather, central banks should pick up the pieces afterwards 
(Greenspan 2002, 2004, 2010).5 However, the global financial crisis demonstrated 
that the cost of an asset price and credit market collapse may be large enough to 
warrant paying some short-term cost to avoid or contain it. As such, there is now 
less focus on whether policy should respond and much more attention being paid to 
which policies should respond and by how much (Bean 2009, Trichet 2009).6
There are two broad views on how this should be done. On the one hand, there are 
those who see a greater role for monetary policy to stem excessive financial cycle 
upswings. On the other hand, there are those of the view that monetary policy 
should play a minimal role, but that the policy framework more generally is 
inadequate and in need of reform. In particular, there has been renewed interest in 
additional policy instruments – macroprudential tools – often motivated by the 
argument that multiple objectives (price and financial stability) require multiple 
instruments (Tinbergen 1952).7 Both streams typically accept the arguments that: 
better enforcement of existing regulations is required; some regulatory reform may 
                                          
4  For a summary of the state of the literature prior to the global financial crisis see Hunter, 
Kaufman and Pomerleano (2003), Richards and Robinson (2003) and Cecchetti (2006). 
5  See Borio, Furfine and Lowe (2001) and Bordo and Jeanne (2002) for a discussion of the 
moral hazard problems associated with this asymmetric approach to policy. 
6  Despite the costs of the recent crisis, some still argue (along established lines) that monetary 
policy should not respond to asset prices (Kohn 2008, Posen 2009 and Greenspan 2010). 
7  Fischer (2010) notes that this principle only applies when the objective is strict in the sense 
that it must be satisfied over a relatively short horizon. 5
be beneficial8; and that reforms should not unduly impinge upon efficiency, nor 
simply push credit provision outside of the regulatory net. 
For those who see a greater role for monetary policy, a number of different 
approaches have been suggested. One possibility – and the focus of earlier work – 
is that asset prices could be: added to the central bank’s target by including them in 
the consumer price index; or incorporated in Taylor-type rules and explicitly 
referred to in the central bank’s mandate (Bryan, Cecchetti and O’Sullivan 2003 
and Cecchetti, Genberg and Wadhwani 2003). There are arguments against this, 
not least that it is difficult to know exactly which asset prices should be included, 
as well as the fact that mechanical approaches have difficulty distinguishing what 
might be relatively sustainable increases in asset prices (Goodhart and 
Hofmann 2002). Others emphasise that large rises in asset prices are more likely to 
be problematic when accompanied by rapid growth in credit and declining lending 
standards.9 Proponents of this view argue that a central bank could use its 
judgement about low frequency movements in a range of variables (not unlike the 
case of more standard monetary policy decisions) to motivate ‘leaning against’ 
emerging financial imbalances. In this regard, concerns should mostly be about 
growth rates (rather than levels) of key variables, such as asset prices or credit, for 
a number of reasons. First, it is hard to know what constitutes a sustainable or 
fundamental level of such variables. Second, while high levels of indebtedness, for 
example, may imply greater vulnerability to adverse shocks, rapid growth may also 
suggest that individual, as well as system-wide, risks have not been fully 
appreciated, and that a larger share of exposures have yet to be tested by a period 
of economic weakness. Third, monetary policy cannot hope to be concerned with 
the level of a particular variable, such as property prices, but by altering the price 
of credit it can influence the willingness to service existing debts and to take on 
new ones. 
                                          
8  This may include measures that better account for the contribution of individual financial 
institutions to systemic risks (Bank of England 2009, Squam Lake Working Group on 
Financial Regulation 2009 and Caruana 2010). 
9  A number of empirical papers suggest that there is a role for variables such as money, credit 
and/or asset prices (particularly property prices) in providing an early indication of emerging 
financial imbalances that will threaten financial stability. See, for example, Borio and 
Lowe (2002), Borio and White (2004), Detken and Smets (2004), ECB (2005) and Borio and 
Drehmann (2009). Inclusion of a monetary aggregate target as one of the two pillars of 
monetary policy by the European Central Bank constitutes a related approach. 6
Counterarguments to a pre-emptive monetary policy approach are numerous (see 
Bernanke 2002, Greenspan 2002 and Gruen, Plumb and Stone 2005, for example). 
There are those who argue that asset price changes may be fundamentally based 
and the associated higher leverage sustainable, so policy should not resist them. 
And even if it is possible to identify a bubble with some confidence, others argue 
that countering it with monetary policy would require such an aggressive response 
that the cost to the ‘non-bubble’ sectors of the economy would be too high. Some 
suggest that trying to end an asset price boom late in the piece might in fact make 
things worse. Finally, the use of monetary policy for this purpose may be difficult 
to explain given central banks’ current mandates. Hence, if CPI inflation is 
contained, new and more targeted ‘macroprudential’ policies may be preferred. 
More recent discussion has focused on these macroprudential policies, which could 
serve as either substitutes for, or complements to, monetary policy.10 These 
policies involve targeting the incentives and ability of lenders to extend credit. A 
number of instruments have been widely discussed, including dynamic 
provisioning, which involves setting aside provisions for expected – rather than 
actual – losses, direct controls on loan-to-valuation ratios and, more recently, 
directly linking regulatory capital to credit and asset price developments.11 One 
advantage of these measures is that they target the problem of rapidly increasing 
financial system leverage. A key disadvantage is that they may drive the more 
risky behaviour outside of the regulatory net. The US subprime crisis provided an 
example of this, with a large build up of risk in the ‘shadow banking system’ prior 
to the crisis eventually putting severe strain on the banking system proper. And 
while it may be possible to bring the existing ‘shadow banking system’ under the 
regulatory umbrella, it is unlikely that new regulation could circumvent regulatory 
arbitrage over the longer term. Indeed, financial innovation is often focused on 
ways to get around the regulatory net. Furthermore, in a globalised financial 
system, regulatory arbitrage may involve financial participants moving across 
borders, complicating the domestic policy options, and necessitating international 
cooperation.
                                          
10 Brunnermeier et al (2009), Fatás et al (2009), FSF (2009) and Haldane (2009). 
11 FSF (2009) discusses these instruments. See also, Borio et al (2001), Borio and Lowe (2004) 
and Griffith-Jones, Ocampo and Ortiz (2009). 7
As with monetary policy, some suggest that macroprudential instruments could be 
subject to a rule (say for LVRs or capital requirements) based on the behaviour of 
particular macro variables, such as asset prices or credit (Goodhart and 
Persaud 2008 and Posen 2009, for example).12 Others highlight the importance of 
discretion on the part of policy-makers given the high degree of uncertainty 
surrounding the most effective approach to combating any particular imbalance 
(Tucker 2009).13 Many of the same issues about rules versus discretion in 
monetary policy are equally applicable to the discussion concerning 
macroprudential instruments. 
In summary, while regulatory overhaul has been the main focus of recent policy 
discussions, debate about the appropriate role of monetary policy has also 
intensified. The apparent pre-crisis consensus of benign neglect has softened, with 
increased interest in approaches which involve monetary policy leaning against 
emerging imbalances to some extent. However, exactly how such imbalances are 
to be identified remains problematic and it is likely that a significant amount of 
judgement is required. This is not surprising given that, despite many important 
similarities, every financial crisis is different from the last in crucial and 
unexpected ways. 
2.2 International Policy Responses – Some Examples 
A key argument against the leaning-against-the-wind approach is that policy-
makers are unlikely to be able to reverse or even slow the course of asset prices 
during an upswing, at least without causing substantial damage to other parts of the 
economy. This argument is difficult to assess because there are only a few 
                                          
12 See Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2007), Borio and Drehmann (2009), Fatás et al (2009), 
Gerdesmeier, Reimers and Roffia (2009) and Kannan, Rabanal and Scott (2009a) for 
discussion of the problems associated with the use of a composite indicator in this regard. 
13 This is supported by recent empirical work (such as Kannan, Rabanal and Scott 2009b, Gruss 
and Sgherri 2009 and N’Diaye 2009), which finds a role for (simple) macroprudential 
instruments in augmenting monetary policy but stresses the need for discretion in the 
implementation and application of such instruments.8
examples of countries that have explicitly used monetary or prudential policies to 
slow asset price growth. In what follows, we review three commonly cited cases.14
2.2.1 Hong Kong 
Restrictions on land supply between 1984 and 1997, and the peg to the US dollar 
via a currency board, meant that Hong Kong was particularly vulnerable to boom-
bust cycles in the housing market. Around 1990, as China became more open to 
investment and trade from Hong Kong, property prices surged. Between 1989 and 
1992, residential property prices rose by around 30 per cent per annum on average 
in Hong Kong (Figure 1). The high concentration of residential loans on the books 
of Hong Kong’s banks (40 per cent of total loans) meant that a rapid reversal of 
such strong price growth was a sizeable risk for the banking system. 
In May 1991, the Hong Kong Commissioner of Banking urged financial 
institutions to tighten lending standards and lower the proportion of net worth that 
could be lent. Some institutions adopted self-imposed LVR ceilings, but by 
November 1991 there was little indication that credit growth was slowing and so 
institutions were asked to take further action. A number of the major banks 
lowered their LVR ceilings to 70 per cent (from around 80 to 90 per cent), which 
saw housing credit growth slow substantially from the December quarter 1991.15
The effectiveness of these restrictions in helping to maintain financial stability was 
tested in 1994 when interest rates increased in line with the US fed funds rate, 
ending Hong Kong’s asset price boom. Although housing prices fell 25 per cent 
from their peak over the next 18 months, mortgage losses remained below 
0.5  per  cent of assets and bank profits rose in 1995 (McCauley, Ruud and 
Iacono 1999).16
                                          
14 Another case is Japan’s use of tax and land supply policies, as well as caps on lending to real 
estate industries in the late 1980s in response to a real estate boom between 1987 and 1989. 
However, the subsequent large decline in land prices and associated problems provide some 
evidence that these policies were implemented too late (see Okina, Shirakawa and 
Shiratsuka 2001 for a discussion of this point and Ito and Iwaisako 1995 for details on the 
episode).
15 Other initiatives about this time included a 60 per cent LVR ceiling for luxury properties and 
a recommended ceiling on the growth rate of mortgage portfolios of 15 per cent per annum. 
16 See Mo and Leechor (1998) for detailed coverage of this episode. 9
Figure 1: Housing Prices and Credit 





















Notes:  (a) Includes all property 
  (b) Household credit 
Sources:  CEIC; Statistics Sweden; Thomson Reuters 
Regulatory controls in Hong Kong have been applied in a flexible way, first by the 
Commissioner of Banking and then by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
(HKMA). Also, regulations have evolved with the financial system. For example, 
maximum LVRs were increased to incorporate the use of lenders’ mortgage 
insurance (LMI) (Yam 2009). The banking system has been stable despite 
significant house price volatility. Even during the Asian financial crisis of 
1997–1998, banks remained resilient (Gerlach and Peng 2005). More recently, 
rising asset prices due to low interest rates once again increased concern about a 
potential boom in credit and asset prices in late 2009. In response, the HKMA 
decreased the maximum LVR on luxury properties (HK$20 million and above) to 
60 per cent. 
Hong Kong is commonly cited as an example of the successful use of 
macroprudential policies in the face of financial imbalances, although the nature of 
its housing market and financial system means that its experience is somewhat 
unique.10
2.2.2 Spain  
Between 1995 and 2000, credit extended to households in Spain grew at an 
average annual rate of 18 per cent. This strong growth followed, in part, from the 
reduction in interest rates (due to entry into the euro area) as well as increased 
competition, which led to an erosion of lending standards; at the same time, 
specific provisions had declined along with the fall in non-performing loans 
(Griffith-Jones et al 2009). In response, the Bank of Spain implemented a system 
of dynamic loan-loss provisions in 2000,17 which forced financial institutions to 
recognise the risk of loan loss when loans entered the balance sheet, rather than 
once loans became impaired.18 The approach was intended to help reduce the 
volatility of credit growth and profits over the business cycle by increasing the cost 
to banks of making increasingly risky loans as asset prices rose, and providing 
them with buffers to protect their balance sheets once prices fell and non-
performing loans increased. 
The scheme was significantly scaled back in 2005 as a result of a conflict with the 
International Accounting Standards Board conventions (adopted by the EU); 
although, provisions still account for about 1.9 per cent of consolidated assets of 
Spanish depository institutions, compared with total equity of about 8.3 per cent 
(Bank of Spain 2010). Griffith-Jones et al (2009) suggest that there is little 
evidence that the practice of dynamic provisioning has reduced the amplitude of 
the credit or house price cycle in Spain, with average annual growth in both 
measures well above the recent historical average between 2000 and 2005 when 
the dynamic provisioning scheme was in effect. However, Saurina (2009) indicates 
that much of the pool of provisions amassed since the scheme’s inception was 
drawn on over the course of 2009, supporting financial institutions during the 
global financial crisis. Overall though, it is perhaps too early to tell the extent to 
which the use of this policy instrument in Spain was successful in maintaining 
financial stability. 
                                          
17 See Caruana (2005), Griffith-Jones et al (2009) and Saurina (2009). 
18  For a detailed discussion of dynamic provisioning, see Fernández de Lis, Pagés and 
Saurina (2000) and Caruana (2005). 11
2.2.3 Sweden
Perhaps the policy response most similar to the Australian experience was that of 
the Riksbank between 2005 and 2007.19 During this period, housing prices and 
housing credit increased by 11 and 13 per cent per annum on average, respectively. 
At the same time, the Riksbank raised its policy rate by 200 basis points and 
publicised its concerns about the sustainability of the expansion and the 
implications of a sharp house price correction for the financial system and broader 
economy. In 2005, six of the seven media statements released following policy 
decisions flagged concerns about developments in asset prices and household 
credit (Hoerova et al 2009), and in 2006 the policy rate was increased with 
concerns about rapidly rising house prices and household indebtedness referred to 
in the policy statement.20 The Riksbank was criticised for its approach. In a report 
commissioned by the Swedish Parliament, Giavazzi and Mishkin (2006) suggested 
that it was a mistake for policy to consider developments beyond those relevant to 
CPI inflation. More recently, however, Hoerova et al (2009) contend that the 
policy tightening, when combined with public announcements about the dangers of 
the housing market boom, helped to moderate the financial upswing. 
3. Asset Prices and Credit Cycles in Australia 
3.1 Key Features of Australia’s Earlier Financial Cycles 
Australia has a long history of cycles in both asset prices and credit. Four episodes 
stand out as having had some degree of financial system instability and an 
economic slowdown. At the core of these episodes was a boom and bust in the 
property market centred on the early 1890s, early 1930s, mid 1970s and late 
1980s/early 1990s.21 Despite their similarities, there were substantial differences 
                                          
19  See Nyberg (2005), Giavazzi and Mishkin (2006) and Hoerova, Monnet and 
Temzelides (2009). The banking crisis in Sweden in 1990, which followed a boom in credit 
and property prices in the late 1980s, required the Government to take a large equity share in 
the banks. The fact that this severe episode was in the living memory of bankers and policy-
makers may have contributed to the approach taken to the housing boom of the mid 2000s. 
20 See, for example, http://www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=20017.
21For a detailed comparison of these episodes see Kent and D’Arcy (2000) and 
Kent (forthcoming). Simon (2003) provides a broad discussion of booms and busts in 
Australian asset markets. 12
across these episodes in terms of the extent of damage done to the financial system 
during the phase of declining asset prices. These differences can in the main be 
traced back to the strength of competitive pressures, the prudence of financial 
institutions and the decline in lending standards during the expansionary phases. 
The most extreme cycle, and the most damaging, lay behind the 1890s depression. 
The expansionary phase was underpinned by a sharp rise in competitive pressures 
among financial institutions, which encouraged an easing in lending standards and 
rapid growth of credit, much of which was channelled into the booming property 
market. The eventual downturn in the property market led to a severe financial 
crisis and a depression unequalled in Australia’s experience. In stark contrast, 
Australia’s financial system was relatively stable during the 1930s depression, 
notwithstanding a pronounced cycle in property prices. The cycle in credit was 
substantial but somewhat muted compared with the 1890s, helped in part by less 
intensive competitive pressures and more prudent behaviour by the banks. In turn, 
this reflected the change in market structure since the 1890s crisis and the memory 
of that disastrous episode. 
The credit and property price cycle of the mid 1970s was spurred on by rising 
competition from an emerging fringe of non-bank financial institutions, while 
banks remained tightly constrained by regulations. There was a pronounced cycle 
in commercial property, ultimately leading to the failure of almost half of the 
largest 20 finance companies. However, high levels of debt were less problematic 
because much of the correction in real property prices occurred via relatively rapid 
generalised inflation. 
The cycle in credit and property prices of the late 1980s/early 1990s was driven by 
improving economic conditions and easier lending standards, which followed from 
financial deregulation in the 1980s. Businesses were the main recipients of the 
more readily available credit. A lot of reliance was placed on property as collateral. 
Not surprisingly then, the large rise in corporate gearing was associated with a 
boom in the commercial property market. Sydney office prices more than doubled 
between 1986 and 1989 but fell sharply thereafter to levels seen around seven 
years earlier (Figure 2). The October 1987 stock market crash had little impact on 
the commercial property market (or the economy more generally). It was not until 
interest rates were increased substantially that commercial property prices began to 13
decline, with adverse effects on financial institutions and the economy more 
broadly. Eventually, two of Australia’s largest banks experienced sizeable losses 
and had to issue more equity. The early 1990s recession was long lasting, in large 
part because of the substantial financial headwinds (Macfarlane  2006). 
Importantly, this event was in the living memory of bankers and policy-makers 
during the 2000s boom in housing prices and household credit. 


























Note:  (a) As a share of GDP 
Sources:  ABS; APRA; Jones Lang LaSalle; RBA; REIA 
3.2 Housing Market Developments in the Early 2000s 
In contrast to these earlier episodes, the large run-up in housing prices and rapid 
growth of credit in the early 2000s was followed by a levelling out in housing 
prices for a few years, with little if any adverse impact on the financial system 
overall. Between 1997 and 2003, dwelling prices in Australia doubled (growing by 
an average of 13 per cent per annum). Growth was particularly rapid towards 14
the end of this period, with median dwelling prices rising by an average of 
18 per cent per annum in 2002 and 2003.22 Dwelling price growth significantly 
outpaced growth in household disposable income, with the nationwide dwelling-
price-to-income ratio rising from around 2½ in the mid 1990s to a little over 3 by 
2001 and then to 4½ at its peak in early 2004 (Figure 3).23 In late 2003, nationwide 
dwelling prices levelled out. Over the subsequent 18 months, capital city dwelling 
prices were broadly flat, though they fell in some key areas, particularly in western 
Sydney. Thereafter, nationwide dwelling prices grew at about the same pace as 
disposable income, with the price-to-income ratio trending down slightly before 
dipping during the financial crisis and rebounding more recently. The household 
debt-to-income ratio has also been broadly stable since 2006. 
                                          
22 The rise in dwelling prices between 1997 and 2003 was broadly based, albeit with different 
timing and intensity across regions – stronger earlier in the larger cities of Sydney and 
Melbourne (which together account for around 40 per cent of the national dwelling stock), 
and more rapid in the smaller capital cities in 2002 and 2003. 
23 The  capital cities dwelling-price-to-income ratio presented here is biased upwards as the 
income measure includes regional areas, which typically have lower incomes than the capital 
cities. The nationwide measure is lower, though not available for the earlier history. In 
Australia, around 60 per cent of the value of the housing stock is located in the capital cities. 15
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Note:  Income is disposable income after tax and before interest payments. Household sector excludes 
unincorporated enterprises. 
Sources:  ABS; APM; RBA; REIA 
There were many factors which contributed to the prolonged housing price 
appreciation. Most were associated with structural changes that supported a rise in 
household indebtedness and greater demand for housing.24 These included: 
x The effects of the move to a low and stable inflation environment through the 
early 1990s. Lenders in Australia had frequently determined borrowing capacity 
                                          
24 Kent, Ossolinski and Willard (2007) discuss these trends across a range of economies. 16
according to a rule of thumb whereby initial repayments were no more than 
some fixed share of borrowers’ income, typically around 30 per cent of gross 
income (Stevens 1997; RBA 2003a). By reducing nominal interest rates, lower 
inflation worked to ease this constraint by reducing initial repayments. Real 
interest rates also fell after lower inflation was secured, which helped to reduce 
the real costs of funds for institutions. 
x Rising competitive pressures (following financial market deregulation) and 
innovations which reduced the costs and increased the availability of credit. 
Mortgage interest rate margins were compressed significantly, by about 
160 basis points over the second half of the 1990s (Figure 4). Innovations in 
securitisation enabled traditional banking institutions to broaden their funding 
base and provided low cost funding for unregulated lenders employing an 
‘originate-to-distribute’ business model. These changes supported an easing in 
lending standards including via the introduction of new types of loans. 
x A more favourable tax treatment for investors in housing. While Australia’s tax 
arrangements have long been favourable to investors, in September 1999 the 
Federal Government significantly reduced the capital gains tax rate 
(RBA 2003b).25 Although the rental yields were relatively low thereafter 
(Figure 5), the net cash flow position of households investing in rental properties 
was enhanced by the tax treatment of investment-related expenses. 
                                          
25  From September 1999, half of the capital gain from assets held for at least a year became 
exempt from tax; prior to this, taxes were assessed according to real capital gains (based on 
the CPI). The taxpayers’ main residence is exempt from capital gains tax, although interest 
payments are not tax deductible. 17


























Notes:  (a) From 1995 onwards, the actual housing rate is the bank average including discounts. Prior to 1995, the 
actual housing rate is the average of the five major banks’ standard variable rates. 
  (b) Household interest payments as a share of household disposable income. Excludes unincorporated 
enterprises and income is before the deduction of interest payments. 
  (c) Share of the total value of housing loan approvals. 
Sources: ABS;  RBA 
Assessing the extent to which the upswing in housing prices reflected fundamental 
factors is not easy. Most time-series modelling approaches seek to identify a stable 
long-run relationship, but this is notoriously difficult, particularly at times of 
significant structural change. However, given that housing prices had already 
increased substantially over a number of years, the pace of growth in 2002 and 
2003 appeared to be unsustainable.26 Indeed, much of the increased demand for 
housing and finance came from investors (as opposed to owner-occupiers). By 
2003, nearly 45 per cent of all new housing loans were for investment purposes, 
                                          
26  Analysis similar to that of Borio and Lowe (2002) (and updated by Borio and 
Drehmann 2009) using measures of the deviation of credit-to-GDP and house prices from 
real-time trends, suggests that such ‘gap’ indicators breached the threshold values (posited by 
Borio and Lowe) around 2002–2003. Hence, imbalances that have historically been associated 
with financial crises were present in the period of interest. However, the results of this 
approach are quite sensitive to the choice of smoothing parameters, which would likely limit 
its usefulness as a way of gauging imbalances for application in a rule-based approach to 
policy.18
compared to around 25 per cent over the four years prior to 2003, and an even 
lower share prior to this (Figure 4). This was despite very low rental yields, 
providing some evidence that investors were motivated by expectations of after-tax 
returns due to capital gains rather than the current investment income (Figure 5).
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Financial innovations
criteria on investor loans became easier from around 1996 as they moved into line 
with those that applied to owner-occupiers. Along with the removal of the interest 
rate penalty on investor loans (of about 1 percentage point in the mid 1990s), low-
equity and interest-only loans became readily available. Also, new products – such 
as deposit bonds – allowed investors to purchase off-the-plan properties with no 
cash outlay upfront and with only small outlays to finance ongoing costs. At about 
the same time, a number of non-financial companies began to promote investment 
in residential property. It was ‘not uncommon … for promoters … to suggest that 
due to the operation of the tax system, investors [could] purchase an investment 
property worth $400,000 or $500,000 for as little as $50 per week’ (RBA 2003b, 
p 39). 19
Broader macroeconomic conditions were also conducive to rising household 
indebtedness as Australia’s economy fared well through the global downturn of 
2001, growing at an average rate of 4  per cent from 2001–2003. Initially this 
resilience reflected Australia’s low production of information technology, and later 
was partly due to strength in the housing market and the effect of this on 
consumption. Australia’s unemployment rate rose through 2001, though only back 
to levels of a year earlier, and by 2003 it was back down to around 6 per cent. 
Against the background of a robust economy, housing credit growth picked up 
significantly. From an average of 14 per cent per annum from 1998–2001, it 
stepped up in 2002 and then again in 2003 to 21 per cent, significantly faster than 
the growth of household disposable income. Moreover, investor activity accounted 
for much of this growth. Household surveys (which became available only with 
some delay) suggest that the proportion of households owning investor or second 
homes rose from 16 per cent in 2002 to 20 per cent by 2006. The increase in 
household debt saw the household interest burden rise to new highs (although it 
has subsequently surpassed this level). It also increased the exposure of the 
financial system to the housing market, with housing credit rising from around 
40 per cent of total credit in 1997 to 55 per cent in early 2005. 
Over this period, there was little evidence that overall supply was running either 
substantially behind underlying demand (which would have supported dwelling 
prices) or ahead of underlying demand (which would have pushed down prices).27
While there was a sharp pick-up in construction of apartment buildings, and a 
significant push by property developers to sell these apartments to investors, there 
were few signs of broader excess housing supply, with rental vacancy rates 
returning to around average levels after peaking in 2002 (Figure 5). Any over-
building was fairly localised, with approvals for high-rise residential buildings 
rising sharply over 2002; by 2003 this had contributed to some fears of over-
building in this segment of the market. Dwelling investment rose to above average 
in 2003, at 6½ per cent of GDP, though the introduction of a goods and services 
tax in 2000 – which added volatility into the housing construction measures – 
makes it difficult to assess how much of the run-up in dwelling investment in 
2002–2003 was payback for earlier weakness. 
                                          
27 Estimates of underlying demand can be calculated using data on population growth, average 
household size and the number of vacant dwellings (including holiday houses, etc). 20
Housing market activity started to ease in October 2003 and growth of capital city 
dwelling prices overall stopped in the last two months of 2003 (Figures 6 and 7). 
They then remained broadly steady for about 18 months, though prices fell in 
Sydney and Melbourne. While reliable monthly housing price indicators were not 
available at the time, subsequent improvements allow us to confirm the timing of 
the easing in housing prices. Even so, timely data on auction markets were 
available (around 15 per cent of all residential sales occur at auction in Australia, 
though this varies substantially across cities), and auction clearance rates (the 
number of auctions resulting in a sale relative to auctions that take place) have a 
strong correlation with monthly housing price growth (of 0.9 on a nationwide 
basis). These rates declined in October 2003 and fell substantially to reach levels 
of previous troughs by June 2004.28
Figure 6: Housing Market Indicators 
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Notes:  (a) Capital cities; 13-period Henderson trend 
  (b) Dwelling stock-weighted capital city measure 
Sources:  APM; RBA; REIV; RP Data-Rismark 
                                          
28 Measures of consumer sentiment regarding whether it is a ‘good time to buy a dwelling’ also 
fell sharply in December quarter 2003, after having taken a step down in 2002 from earlier 
very high levels, due to rising interest rates and falling affordability. 21
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3.3 After 2003 
Housing prices fell for a period through 2004 in both Sydney and Melbourne. 
Large declines were apparent in the suburbs in western Sydney, where house prices 
fell by between 5 and 20 per cent (Figure 8). This part of Sydney accounts for 
about 6 per cent of the national housing stock and tends to have lower-priced 
housing than much of Sydney; prices also peaked later than in the rest of Sydney. 
A significant number of late entrants into the housing market in western Sydney 
had loans with high LVRs and low documentation. Also, mortgage originators (as 
opposed to banking institutions) comprised a greater share of new lending in this 22
region than in others and, partly through looser lending standards, were able to 
increase their market share. Accordingly, western Sydney was the region of 
Australia that exhibited the most substantial rise in housing loan arrears and 
mortgage defaults, with an arrears rate considerably higher than the average arrears 
rate for loans in other parts of Sydney. 
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Notes:  (a) Weighted average of suburb medians 
  (b) Prime loans securitised by all lenders 
Sources:  ABS; Perpetual; RBA; Residex 
From 2004 until 2007, housing prices nationwide grew broadly in line with 
household disposable incomes and housing credit growth slowed considerably, 
especially for investors. Rents, which had previously not grown very strongly, 
picked up and there was an upward trend in the rental yield, consistent with low 
rental vacancy rates and a relative decline in home building. The shake-out of the 
housing market also had implications for financial institutions’ balance sheets. 
On-balance sheet arrears for banks rose gradually and reached a local maximum of 
around 0.5 per cent of housing loans in early 2007, though they subsequently rose 
a little further largely due to increasing interest rates. Arrears rates on securitised 
housing loans rose earlier, by more and to a higher level, partly reflecting the 
larger share of low-documentation loans in the securitised pool.23
The rise in housing loan arrears was eventually reflected in more widespread 
concerns about lending practices and some additional tightening in lending 
standards, although pinpointing the timing and extent of this is hindered by data 
limitations.29 Periodic surveys of banks and data on the characteristics of 
securitised mortgages provide some information in this regard, though these 
provide only a partial view due to significant shifts in the market share of mortgage 
lenders. Available evidence suggests that lending standards tightened after housing 
prices declined, albeit with considerable delay. Eventually, a parliamentary inquiry 
was held on ‘Home Lending Practices and Processes’ in August 2007, with 
submissions from a range of institutions including the Reserve Bank, APRA and 
the lenders’ mortgage insurance (LMI) providers. Australia’s largest LMI provider, 
Genworth Financial, noted a number of areas in which insurance companies could 
help to ensure prudent lending practices, including detailed underwriting 
guidelines for high LVR loans, procedures to verify property valuations, and 
scoring techniques to identify high-risk loans (Genworth Financial 2007). 
4. Australian Policy Developments 
This section summarises the statements by, and actions of, the relevant policy 
authorities, including the Reserve Bank, in the period from 2002 to 2004 in 
response to housing market developments. This is based on an examination of 
public statements. For the Bank, these include the quarterly Statement on Monetary 
Policy (SMP), statements to parliamentary committees,30 media releases related to 
policy announcements and speeches by senior Bank officials. A detailed summary 
of these statements is provided in Appendix A. It is also worth noting that over this 
period, the Bank devoted considerable resources to the analysis and research of 
trends in Australian housing prices and housing finance. This included a careful 
comparison with developments in a range of other relevant economies. The results 
of these efforts were released in a number of articles, including an extensive 
                                          
29 APRA now collects data on types of loans by banking institutions and LVRs on new loans. 
30 See Macfarlane (2002a, 2002b, 2003b, 2003c). 24
submission by the Bank to the Productivity Commission Inquiry on First Home 
Ownership (RBA 2003b).31
While the wider debate surrounding the role of monetary policy in responding to 
asset prices was particularly vigorous in this period, these issues had been under 
consideration by the Reserve Bank for some time. In the late 1990s and early 
2000s, the Bank released a number of papers dealing with issues of asset-price 
bubbles, credit cycles and episodes of financial instability. Some provided an 
examination of Australia’s historical experiences of financial instability, while 
others undertook more abstract analysis using a more structured framework.32 The 
broad conclusion was that rapid growth in asset prices and leverage, accompanied 
by declining lending standards, can pose a risk to financial and macroeconomic 
stability more generally. This was echoed by a number of participants at the 
Reserve Bank’s 2003 conference on asset prices and monetary policy (Richards 
and Robinson 2003). 
4.1 Policies and Discussions 
As the previous Section describes, there were fundamental factors underpinning 
the rise in housing prices over the second half of the 1990s and the early 2000s in 
Australia. However, developments in 2002 and 2003 began to cause some unease 
for policy-makers, as the pace of growth in housing prices and credit were 
accelerating to very rapid rates and there were signs that lending standards were 
declining in a number of important respects. The very prominent role of investors 
in the housing market also suggested a strong speculative element.
The broad approach of the Reserve Bank can be summarised as follows. The Bank 
attempted to draw attention to the longer-term risks associated with recent trends, 
especially the high rates of growth of housing prices and housing credit. In 
                                          
31 This type of analysis and research continued beyond 2003. For example, in 2004 the Bank, in 
conjunction with private sector firms and the Australian Bureau of Statistics, made 
considerable effort to develop robust and timely measures of housing prices (see the 
July 2004 RBA Bulletin, Hansen 2006 and Prasad and Richards 2006), many of which are 
used in this paper. 
32  For detailed consideration of Australia’s historical experience with asset-price bubbles see 
Kent and D’Arcy (2000) and Kent (forthcoming). For a more theoretical approach regarding 
the case for monetary policy to act against asset prices ex-ante, see Kent and Lowe (1997a, 
1997b). Gruen et al (2005) highlight arguments against pre-emptive action. 25
particular, the Bank drew attention to the fact that it was unlikely that these trends 
were sustainable over the medium term, and that borrowers entering the market 
based on expectations that prices would continue to rise at a rapid rate were taking 
a significant risk, particularly if highly leveraged. Similarly, the Bank drew 
attention to the risks associated with declining lending standards. During the 
period, monetary policy continued to be set on the basis of medium-term prospects 
for inflation and output and the Bank was not targeting housing prices or credit 
growth. However, developments in the housing market were an important factor in 
the Bank not delaying a tightening of monetary policy that was likely to be 
required on more general macroeconomic grounds.33 The Bank’s explanations of 
its monetary policy decisions also highlighted the risks in the housing market. 
The Reserve Bank started raising concerns about housing market developments in 
early 2002. Between 2002 and late 2003 there was a clear progression of themes 
relating to housing price and credit growth in Bank statements as it endeavoured to 
use ‘open mouth operations’ to draw attention to the risks. While the approach to 
the housing market developments could not be described as an explicitly 
coordinated strategy, regulatory agencies and governing bodies also provided 
pointed discussion of market developments and took some regulatory actions.34 In 
2002/03, APRA undertook a comprehensive stress test of the resilience of housing 
lending portfolios of banking institutions, which led subsequently to a tightening of 
prudential capital requirements for non-standard loans and for lender’s mortgage 
insurers. Federal taxation authorities sought to better enforce the tax code relating 
                                          
33 Combination forecasts from a suite of macroeconomic forecasting models (using the current 
vintage of data and current parameter estimates) confirm this. The central tendency of the 
cash rate projections from the models suggested gradual increases in the cash rate from 
around mid 2002 and late 2003. The increase in rates in May and June 2002 left the cash rate 
about 30 basis points above the median combination forecast around that time. Similarly, the 
increases in November and December 2003 left the cash rate about 35 basis points above the 
median forecast around that time. For a discussion of the combination forecasts, see Gerard 
and Nimark (2008). Jääskelä and Nimark (2008) describe the DSGE model used in the suite; a 
fourth ‘Minnesota VAR’ model has also been included. 
34 The Council of Financial Regulators (CFR), which has representatives from APRA, ASIC and 
the Federal Treasury and is chaired by the Reserve Bank Governor, provides a formal link 
between these institutions. There is evidence in the CFR’s Annual Report, published in 
September 2003, of growing concerns about the housing market, particularly that the 
‘exceptionally fast increase in borrowing for investor housing has clearly increased risk and 
that the accompanying rapid expansion in apartment building shows all the signs of a 
seriously over-extended market’ (CFR 2003, p 19). 26
to deductions stemming from investment properties, and state governments 
tightened regulations regarding the conduct of auctions. The Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (ASIC) and the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC) also played a role by investigating alleged illegal 
activities by a number of property marketers. 
4.1.1 Developments in 2002 
Prior to 2002, housing price developments were often discussed by the Reserve 
Bank in the context of positive wealth effects, as the domestic economy attempted 
to shrug off the headwinds associated with slow global growth. As the recovery 
gained momentum domestically, the focus turned to the possibility of overbuilding 
in some segments of the medium-density housing market, and to the question of 
the risks associated with rapid growth in credit and house prices. 
The Bank tightened monetary policy in May 2002 and again in June (by 25 basis 
points on each occasion) (Figure 9). In explaining the Bank’s general strategy, the 
May 2002 SMP highlighted that while inflation was expected to ease to around the 
middle of the target through 2002, inflationary pressures were expected to pick up 
over the course of 2003 as the economy strengthened. The Bank, however, also 
suggested that low rates risked fuelling imbalances associated with a strong rise in 
house prices and household borrowing over a number of years. For example, in the 
statement accompanying the May 2002 monetary policy decision it was noted that: 
To persist with a strongly expansionary policy setting … could fuel other 
imbalances such as the current overheating in the housing market, potentially 
jeopardising the economy’s continued expansion. (RBA Media Release – 8 May 
2002)27
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While the structural shift in the availability of housing finance and macroeconomic 
conditions more generally justified strong growth in house prices in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, low interest rates and tax arrangements were encouraging 
investors and subsidies were boosting first-home buyer demand. Poor returns on 
alternative investments in the wake of the dot-com bust were also emphasised 
(Macfarlane 2002b, Stevens 2002). Further, the Bank noted that:35
… whenever [a structural shift] of this type occurs, there is the risk that prices may 
overshoot, as some purchasers extrapolate past movements as a guide to future 
capital gains. This may be occurring at present, since the low rental yield on 
property, and high rental vacancy rates, seem inconsistent with rapidly rising house 
prices. (SMP – May 2002, pp 31–32) 
                                          
35 See also Macfarlane (2002b, 2002c) and the July 2002 RBA Bulletin.28
This line of argument continued throughout 2002 with the clear goal of 
highlighting the risks: 
… the potential for further capital gains in the housing market [is] likely to be 
countered by increased supply of rental properties, rising vacancy rates and falling 
rents in some areas. (SMP – August 2002, p 2) 
However, over the second half of 2002, deterioration in the prospects for global 
growth and a marked increase in the volatility of global share markets led to an 
increased focus on near-term downside risks to the domestic economy. Growth in 
output and inflation failed to reach the rates forecast when the 2002 tightenings 
were conducted, and in spite of the risk posed by rapid growth in credit and house 
prices, further moves towards a more neutral monetary policy setting were judged 
not to be appropriate (SMP August and November 2002). 
An impact of the policy tightenings and the accompanying statements on the 
housing market was not obvious in the near-term. For example, loan approvals to 
investors for housing continued to grow rapidly, increasing by more than 
40 per cent in 2002. The Governor, in testimony to a parliamentary committee, 
emphasised, however, that: 
… the market works, but with long lags during which people are encouraged to take 
decisions based on little more than optimistic extrapolation of what happened in the 
past. Developers will continue to put up new apartment blocks while there are 
investors willing to precommit to buy. These are the investors who turn up at 
seminars where they are told by the developers how they can become very rich if 
they highly gear themselves and buy an apartment. (Macfarlane 2002b) 
Discussion by the Bank of the sustainability of the high rate of price increases 
continued throughout 2002 (Stevens 2002, for example). The Bank also began to 
highlight the role of speculation, the risks associated with rapid growth in leverage, 
and emerging evidence of a reduction in lending standards (see below). Initially, 
the focus was on the prospect of financial hardship for overburdened investors in 
the event of a substantial correction in the housing market, but attention was also 
directed to the potential effects of increased loan defaults on financial stability. 29
4.1.2 Developments in 2003 
In early 2003, the Reserve Bank reiterated its concerns in the SMP about these 
risks:
… the run-up in housing prices and associated expansion in housing-related debt 
were a source of concern for most of the past year, given the potential of such a 
process to remain disconnected from fundamentals and develop into a significant 
imbalance over time. (SMP – February 2003, p 3) 
At the same time, some comfort was taken from the tentative signs that pressures 
in the housing market were easing, particularly in the investor segment. As it 
turned out, these signs did not persist as the year progressed. 
In a speech in April 2003, the Governor outlined the Bank’s concerns regarding 
rising household indebtedness (Macfarlane 2003a). The worry was not so much 
that a housing market downturn would directly impinge upon financial stability, 
but rather that it could have adverse consequences for household consumption and 
economic activity more generally.36 Also, the increasingly dominant role of 
investors in the housing market reinforced earlier concerns that some households 
did not adequately appreciate the risks and were simply extrapolating recent price 
trends.
Through 2003, the Reserve Bank repeatedly drew attention to the risks associated 
with ongoing rapid growth of house prices and housing credit. It also 
acknowledged that there might be occasions when monetary policy might need to 
be tightened in response to emerging financial imbalances. The contention was that 
such a response could be justified within its flexible inflation-targeting framework, 
which allowed longer-term considerations to be taken into account. If imbalances 
in the housing market could pose a threat to medium-term economic stability, it 
made sense to tolerate a higher policy rate than that which was justified by shorter-
term inflation pressures. In a speech, the Deputy Governor explained this in terms 
of a risk-management approach to policy decisions (Stevens 2003b):37
                                          
36 Stevens (2003c) provides further discussion of this point.
37 Macfarlane (2002c) and Stevens (2003a) provide similar arguments in support of intervention. 30
… a case might be made, on rare occasions, to adopt a policy of ‘least regret’ so far 
as asset prices are concerned, if financial and macroeconomic stability were thought 
to be at risk. 
It is worth noting that while the Reserve Bank of Australia did not raise rates until 
late 2003, it stands out as having not cut rates through the year, whereas monetary 
policy in every other developed economy, and in most of the large developing 
economies, was eased at some point during 2003 in response to subdued 
inflationary pressures (and fears of deflation in some cases) (IMF 2003). 
Meanwhile, unease surrounding lending practices was being aired by APRA. In 
late 2002, APRA wrote to the chief executives of authorised deposit-taking 
institutions (ADIs),38 calling for a conservative approach to risk and urging them 
to avoid the temptation of relaxing lending standards in the wake of such a long 
and sustained economic upswing; this correspondence was made public soon after 
the fact (APRA 2002). While APRA acknowledged the generally healthy state of 
Australian financial institutions, through 2003 it raised a number of concerns about 
some emerging trends in the mortgage market, including the growth of broker-
originated and ‘non-conforming’ lending, as well as the substantial increase in the 
use of lenders’ mortgage insurance.39 APRA noted that: ‘… the psychology of 
home lending has changed from a credit rationing process to a product marketing 
process’ (Littrell 2003). This had contributed to an increase in average LVRs for 
mortgages, an over-reliance (by lenders) on collateral as a signal of a borrower’s 
suitability, and a decline in the attention given to the ability to repay loans. So 
while APRA’s stress test of institutions’ housing lending portfolios around that 
time revealed that the financial system was well placed to weather a downturn in 
the housing market, it raised some concerns, particularly for some institutions that 
were not compiling important information regarding the extent and nature of their 
exposures (Laker 2003).40
                                          
38  ADIs (which we also describe loosely as ‘banking institutions’) include banks, building 
societies and credit unions. 
39 See, for example, APRA (2003), Esho (2003) and Littrell (2003). 
40 One illustration of these points is provided by Laker (2007), which notes that some banking 
institutions had – drawing on their own stress tests – perceived credit losses on their mortgage 
portfolios to be in the order of 10 basis points, some 10 times lower than suggested by 
APRA’s own stress tests of 2002/03. 31
The Reserve Bank also commented on the increased level of risk on the balance 
sheets of financial institutions. At a parliamentary committee in December 2002, 
the Governor highlighted deposit bonds as a key factor fuelling speculation and 
increasing risks for more vulnerable investors: 
… there are new financial instruments such as deposit bonds that have been created 
that just make it so easy for people to do it [invest/speculate in property]. People 
can actually make these investments on almost 100 per cent gearing. 
(Macfarlane 2002b) 
In addition, the Reserve Bank’s Annual Report for 2003 (released in September) 
noted the increased risk posed by non-standard products such as home equity loans 
and redraw facilities, which allowed borrowers to build up more debt and run it 
down more slowly than had previously been the norm. 
One factor that appeared to play some role in drawing attention to the risks in the 
housing sector was the crackdown on property investment seminars, in particular, 
the high-profile case of ‘spruiker’ (or promoter) Henry Kaye and his companies. In 
March 2003, ASIC commenced legal proceedings, alleging dissemination of false 
and misleading information by Mr Kaye and others.41 When ASIC uncovered 
evidence that the law had been breached it appointed administrators and receivers 
to each of the companies involved. The effect of this on the confidence of investors 
was reinforced by the commitment of the ACCC in September 2003 to crackdown 
on deceptive conduct by property marketers, and by increased scrutiny of tax 
deductions stemming from rental expenses by the ATO. Also, in September 2003, 
regulations governing sales of residential property at auctions were tightened in 
New South Wales and Victoria; in particular, the legislative changes were aimed to 
reduce the number of dummy bids at auctions.42
Towards the end of 2003, the Reserve Bank raised the cash rate, by 25 basis points 
in November and again in December. The accompanying media release in 
November cited the strength in the demand for credit as a reason not to delay a 
                                          
41 Aside from legal breaches, there were allegations that marketers charged sizeable consultancy 
fees for investment advice, such as to purchase properties in which advisors had undisclosed 
financial interests (http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/09/21/1064082867568.html).
42See, for example, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_reg/psabar2003476/.32
tightening that was called for on general macroeconomic grounds. At the same 
time, the inflation forecasts were revised in light of further appreciation of the 
exchange rate and stronger-than-expected growth in domestic demand, with 
inflation expected to trough somewhat lower than 2 per cent in 2004 but with a 
more pronounced pick-up, to 2½  per cent in the second half of 2005 (SMP
November 2003; Figure 9). It is worth noting that because of the predominance of 
variable rate housing loans in Australia, increases in the cash rate were quickly 
passed through to higher costs for existing and new borrowers.43
In the months that followed, the Reserve Bank pointed to data suggesting that the 
rate of increase in housing prices was slowing and the housing market had turned 
down:
It remains to be seen to what extent the weakening in the inner-city property 
markets in Sydney and Melbourne will spread more widely across the national 
market. However, it is clear that sentiment about the property market has softened. 
(SMP – February 2004, p 27) 
Following this, there was discussion of the need for credit growth – which up to 
mid 2004 had yet to show any real weakening – to slow to more sustainable levels. 
Finally, a number of developments appeared to have reinforced the housing market 
correction over 2004. In particular, the ACCC took further action against property 
marketers and purveyors of ‘get-rich-quick’ schemes involving property where 
there were concerns about fraud; and the NSW Government instituted a new tax on 
investment housing aimed at reducing the influence of speculation (although this 
was partly offset by a reduction in other taxes).44
                                          
43See Bloxham and Kent (2009) for a comparison of the US and Australian housing markets in 
this regard. 
44 The NSW Government levied a 2¼ per cent stamp duty on properties (excluding own homes) 
where the sale price was more than 12 per cent higher than the purchase price; although, this 
vendor duty could be claimed as a deduction against capital gains tax, thereby reducing its 
effective rate. The duty came into effect on 1 July 2004 and was withdrawn on 
2 August 2005. 33
4.2 Media Reports of RBA Statements 
While it is difficult to quantify the effect of the Reserve Bank’s ‘open mouth
operations’ over this episode, we can at least confirm that the Bank’s statements 
were widely reported at the time in the popular press. A survey of some of the 
major papers from around Australia shows that coverage of the Bank’s comments 
on housing market issues increased noticeably between 2002 and 2004. Based on a 
keyword search of articles mentioning the Reserve Bank of Australia and interest 
rates, the proportion that also mentioned housing increased from an average of 
10 per cent in 2001 to 18 per cent in 2002 and 26 per cent in 2003, before trending 
down in the following couple of years (Figure 10). The timing of these changes 
aligns with the pattern of Bank statements over this period. 













Notes:  Percentage of articles mentioning ‘RBA’ and ‘interest rates’ that also mention ‘housing’. The series break 
in October 2002 is due to limited economic coverage after the Bali terrorist bombing in that month. 
Source:  Dow Jones Factiva database 
A similar exercise shows that the proportion of articles on the Reserve Bank and 
interest rates which also discussed credit increased between 2002 and 2003, 
although the series is much more volatile from one month to the next. This share 
was sustained at a high level in 2004 (at around 10 per cent on average), at the 34
height of Bank statements regarding the need for a return to more sustainable 
levels of credit growth.  
Approaching the question from a slightly different perspective, it was found that 
the percentage of articles mentioning housing that also contained a reference to the 
Reserve Bank of Australia also trended up significantly over the period, peaking 
sharply around the November 2003 cash rate increase, before trending down 
through 2004 and 2005. 
5. Conclusions
The role of policy in responding to asset prices remains a contentious issue. 
However, support for the approach of responding only after damaging asset price 
declines are underway has diminished in light of the fall-out from the global 
financial crisis. An idea that appears to be gaining wider acceptance is that there is 
a case for policy to focus on financial imbalances more generally, rather than asset 
prices in particular. 
If one accepts that policy should, on occasions, respond in some way to growing 
financial imbalances then the issue is which policies should be used to respond and 
how much should they ‘lean against’ these imbalances. In contrast to the earlier 
debates about whether to burst asset-price bubbles, more attention is now being 
focused on an intermediate path of leaning against emerging imbalances with a 
view to reducing their severity and hence the cost of any subsequent financial and 
macroeconomic disturbances. For monetary policy, this would require, at a 
minimum, avoiding periods of unnecessarily low interest rates that might 
exacerbate imbalances. Of course, such a strategy is likely to be more effective if 
complemented by a tightening of macroprudential and other policies. 
One difficulty in this whole debate is that there is little practical evidence about 
how effective an intermediate leaning strategy might be. The Australian experience 
of 2002 to 2004 is potentially relevant. A key feature of this episode was the 
significant influence of investors, as well as the decline in lending standards during 
the expansionary phase. This raised concerns within the Reserve Bank and APRA 
regarding the risks associated with such trends. 35
The Bank highlighted the risks associated with sustained high rates of housing 
price and credit growth when the cash rate was raised in 2002. This was not 
inconsistent with the Bank’s inflation-targeting framework, which allows for a 
degree of flexibility, including the ability to account for potential risks to longer-
term prospects. From 2002 to 2003, the frequency with which the Bank highlighted 
the risks arising from housing market developments increased. In late 2003, the 
Bank raised rates again, highlighting concerns about the pace of housing price and 
credit growth. This came around the same time as the release of the results of 
APRA’s stress test of housing loan portfolios, the ATO announcement of an 
increase in the number of audits of individuals claiming tax deductions on rental 
properties, and the prosecution of a high-profile property marketer by ASIC. A 
number of measures suggest that housing prices peaked around December 2003. 
Most importantly, the turnaround in the market was associated with a sharp 
reduction in the role of investors and clearly demonstrated that large parts of the 
market can and do experience falling prices. 
It is difficult to draw a definitive link between these housing market developments 
on the one hand, and the policy actions and associated statements on the other. One 
problem is that it is difficult to come up with a robust structural model of housing 
prices. Another related problem is the time it takes for policies to gain traction in 
the face of growing speculative pressures. Some might be tempted to argue that the 
rise in the cash rate in late 2003 (of 50 basis points) was too small to turnaround 
the housing market and suggest, therefore, that the market turned on its own 
accord. However, the timing of the turnaround is consistent with the cumulative 
impact of the full range of modest but consistent policy actions – by the Bank as 
well as the regulatory authorities – affecting the dynamics in the housing market. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to know what might have happened if the Reserve Bank 
had remained silent, kept monetary policy looser than was the case, and the 
regulatory authorities had not responded. 
Looking beyond 2004, it has been suggested that the turnaround was temporary, 
that house prices did not fall by much and have subsequently rebounded 
(Posen 2009). However, this ignores some important and persistent effects of the 
turnaround that started in late 2003. Perhaps most importantly, it provided a stark 
and timely reminder that house prices can fall and that those with high rates of 
leverage are more vulnerable to such corrections. Consistent with this, investors 36
have played a less prominent role in the market since that time. Also, the 
subsequent rise in loan arrears for non-conforming and low documentation loans 
clearly highlighted the greater risks associated with these products. Finally, the 
ratio of housing prices to income has been reasonably flat for a number of years. 37
Appendix A: Timeline of Key Public Statements/Publications 
Date Event/Description 
2001
7 May  RBA – SMP 
‘It is possible that the recent concentration of activity has resulted in some degree of over-
building in some areas.’ p 21 
30 Sep  APRA – Working Paper: Asset Price Bubbles and Prudential Regulation 
‘On balance we conclude that the role for financial regulation in controlling the emergence 
of, and damage from, asset price bubbles remains relatively limited.’ p 22 
12 Nov  RBA – SMP 
‘… the current level of building approvals is well above most estimates of underlying 
demand.’ p 28 
‘… mounting evidence that rental vacancy rates are rising, particularly for medium-density 
dwellings …’ p 28 
2002
12 Feb  RBA – SMP 
‘Oversupply is particularly evident in medium-density dwellings, where there are high 
vacancy rates in some states.’ p 24 
8 May  RBA – Media release after policy tightening 
‘To persist with a strongly expansionary policy setting would risk amplifying inflation 
pressures and, over time, could fuel other imbalances such as the current overheating in the 
housing market, potentially jeopardising the economy’s continued expansion.’ 
10 May  RBA – SMP 
‘A continuation of this trend [of rapid increases in debt] clearly carries the risk of households, 
at some point, becoming overstretched.’ p 2 
31 May  RBA – Governor – Testimony to House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Economics, Finance and Public Administration 
‘I do not think we are going to get that overshoot [in asset prices]. I sincerely hope it does not 
happen because those sorts of events are very disruptive.’ 
‘… overall average measures of house prices are still going up, but we can see in some 
important areas that oversupply has already occurred.’ 38
Date Event/Description 
5 Jun  RBA – Media release after policy tightening 
‘… continued rapid expansion of household debt.’ 
‘Today’s action is aimed at reducing the risk of potential imbalances, and thereby promoting 
sustainable expansion of the economy with low inflation.’ 
18 Jul  RBA – Bulletin: Recent Developments in Housing: Prices, Finance and Investor Attitudes 
‘It would be unlikely that further strong price increases could co-exist with rising vacancy 
rates and falling rental yields for very long. It is more likely that any assumption by investors 
that future capital gains can be assured will have to undergo some revision.’ p 6 
12 Aug  RBA – SMP 
‘[The continued rapid growth in investor finance] looks to be in part a result of expectations 
by investors that the strong increases in housing prices over recent years will continue into 
the future. However, the attractiveness of this form of investment now appears to be waning, 
with the potential for further capital gains in the housing market likely to be countered by 
increased supply of rental properties, rising vacancy rates and falling rents in some areas.’ p 2
21 Aug  RBA – Speech – Governor: What Does Good Monetary Policy Look Like? 
The rate of growth in the investor segment in the context of rising vacancy rates and stagnant 
or falling rents suggests a ‘… mis-allocation of investment, and the likelihood of a shakeout 
in the market, at least in the major cities. If that is to occur, it is better that it occur sooner 
rather than later’. 
1 Oct  APRA – Media Release: APRA Reminds Banks to Observe Conservative Risk Management 
Practices
‘While we are not presently observing unsound loan growth in any systemic sense, we urge 
the industry to maintain prudent property lending practices …’ 
14 Oct  RBA – Speech – Deputy Governor: Medium-term Economic Prospects for Australia 
‘But at present, our focus is on the role of investors in rental dwellings, which has become 
much more prominent in the past couple of years. These are people who presumably have 
been attracted by perceptions of capital gains and tax advantages of leverage, and who 
recently may have been disappointed with returns in the share market.’ 
‘It is getting harder and harder to believe that the prospective returns from that outlook are 
high enough either to sustain valuations which are so high relative to historical experience, or 
to warrant the $4–5 billion which is being loaned to investors each month.’ 39
Date Event/Description 
11 Nov  RBA – SMP 
‘Investors have played a large part in the buoyancy of the housing market, accounting for 
virtually all of the growth in new finance approvals in the sector over the past year, 
presumably in expectation of strong growth in prices. It has been apparent, however, that this 
process would not be sustainable indefinitely, with emerging oversupply being bound at some 
point to limit the scope for further price increases.’ p 3 
13 Nov  RBA – Speech – Governor: Monetary Policy in an Uncertain World 
‘It seemed pretty clear to us that investors were moving into an already over-supplied market, 
and this behaviour could only be explained by their usual desire for tax minimisation plus 
their expectation that they would benefit from future large capital gains, an expectation which 
was encouraged by the marketing programs employed by developers of investment 
properties.’
‘It is the length of this expansion, as much as the other things I have described, that provided 
the environment which encouraged this type of investor behaviour.’ 
6 Dec  RBA – Governor – Testimony to House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Economics, Finance and Public Administration 
‘Our purpose in what we have been saying is to try to get the market to work a little better 
and so avoid the overshooting that so often characterises parts of the property market.’ 
‘… the market works, but with long lags during which people are encouraged to take 
decisions based on little more than optimistic extrapolation of what happened in the past. 
Developers will continue to put up new apartment blocks while there are investors willing to 
precommit to buy. These are the investors who turn up at seminars where they are told by the 
developers how they can become very rich if they highly gear themselves and buy an 
apartment.’ 
19 Dec  RBA – Bulletin: Innovations in the Provision of Finance for Investor Housing 
‘… prospective capital gains and the ability to negatively gear for tax effectiveness have 
always been the major incentives for this type of investment [in rental housing].’ p 1 
‘Over the course of the 1990’s … the supply of finance increased markedly, making geared 
investment in rental properties available to a much wider cross-section of the public than 
formerly.’ p 1 40
Date Event/Description 
2003
22 Jan  APRA – Report on Broker-Originated Lending 
The Australian market for broker-originated lending is reasonably safe however: ‘Over half 
of the institutions (53%) base the broker’s remuneration solely on the volume of business 
generated, providing brokers with an incentive to generate loan volume without appropriate 
regard for risk. With such an incentive structure it is critical that ADIs have procedures in 
place to ensure their own credit assessment standards are rigorously applied to broker-
introduced loans’. 
10 Feb  RBA – SMP 
‘… the run-up in housing prices and associated expansion in housing-related debt were a 
source of concern for most of the past year, given the potential of such a process to remain 
disconnected from fundamentals and develop into a significant imbalance over time. These 
risks, however, appear to have eased somewhat in recent months.’ p 3 
13 Feb  RBA – Speech – Deputy Governor: The Economic Outlook 
‘With one exception, we have not rushed to ring alarm bells about excessive debt. The 
exception is, of course, the rapid growth in debt to finance investment in rental properties, 
where we felt during 2002 that people were being drawn into a position of high leverage by 
unrealistic expectations of returns. At some stage down the track, this is likely to result in 
disappointment for many and distress for some …’ 
25 Feb  APRA – Speech – C Littrell: Mortgage Lending Practices: The APRA View 
‘… the psychology of home lending has changed from a credit rationing process to a product 
marketing process.’ 
‘Although home lending is generally safe, in APRA’s view lenders have become too 
comfortable with this product …’ 
4 Mar  ASIC – Media Release: ASIC Commences Proceedings against Henry Kaye and Others 
ASIC launch proceedings against Henry Kaye for dissemination of false and misleading 
information. 
3 Apr  RBA – Speech – Governor: Do Australian Households Borrow Too Much? 
‘… for a high proportion of these investors, tax considerations drive the profitability 
calculations and so provide an incentive to maximise debt.’ 41
Date Event/Description 
10 Apr  RBA – Speech – Deputy Governor: Inflation Targeting: A Decade of Australian 
Experience
‘Does inflation targeting allow scope for responding to asset price concerns, if that is thought 
to be sensible? I think it does, provided we are prepared to adopt a sufficiently long time 
horizon.’ 
9 May  RBA – SMP 
‘Although loan approvals for housing have levelled out in the past few months, they remain 
at a high level consistent with housing-related credit growth of over 20 per cent, which will 
not be sustainable in the longer run.’ p 3
16 May  RBA – Speech – Assistant Governor (Financial System): Financial System Stability – 
Some Current Observations 
‘… the cloud on the near horizon is the substantial build-up in household debt, which may 
create strains for financial institutions if Australia's economic circumstances were to 
deteriorate and mortgage defaults rise sharply.’ 
6 Jun  RBA – Governor – Testimony to House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Economics, Finance and Public Administration 
‘I think there is now some evidence that in the most speculative hot spots a degree of 
commonsense is returning. Investor interest in inner city apartments, particularly in this city, 
is well down and quite a number of proposed projects have been shelved.’ 
‘We have another financial tool. It is called open-mouth policy, and I have been using it, but 
it may not be as effective as other tools you could conceive of. I am not putting in a plug for 
another instrument, although if in the longer run things turned out badly it would not surprise 
me if people started looking at other arms of policy—for example, tax policy.’ 
‘I think there is a regulatory gap there. It is clearly a problem if there is one group of people 
who are holding seminars on how to invest your money who are regulated—the financial 
planners—and there is another group who are doing almost exactly the same thing, although 
doing it within the one asset class, which is property, who are unregulated. So I think there is 
a need to extend the capacity for ASIC to do that.’ 
27 Jun  ATO – Tax Time Media Kit 2003 – Compliance Focus on Individuals 
Increased focus on compliance especially in the area of rental deductions with increased 
scrutiny and more audits.  42
Date Event/Description 
31 Jul  ASIC – Media Release: ASIC Obtains Undertakings from Henry Kaye and Others 
Obtains undertakings from Henry Kaye limiting his and his associates’ ability to provide 
advice regarding investment in property. 
11 Aug  RBA – SMP (with a special chapter on credit growth) 
‘The risk presented by these developments [rapidly rising debt and house prices] is that, the 
longer they go on, the larger will be the contractionary effect on the economy when they 
inevitably turn.’ p 3 
12 Aug  APRA – Speech – N Esho: APRA’s Approach to Broker Loans in Authorised Deposit 
Taking Institutions 
‘At present APRA is satisfied that ADIs are effectively managing the risks associated with 
broker loans, and therefore see no need at this stage to take any particular action in this area.’
2 Sep  ACCC – Media Release: ACCC Targets Property ‘Scammers’ 
Announcement by ACCC of its intention to target property scammers. 
17 Sep  RBA – Speech – Deputy Governor: Economic Conditions and Prospects 
‘But there cannot be much doubt either that running up debt today must diminish the scope to 
do so in future, and that it must also impair, at the margin, the capacity of some households to 
cope with adverse shocks which might come along.’ 
17 Sep  NSW Govt – Call on Federal authorities to extend the powers of ASIC to better deal with 
property spruikers and wealth creation seminars 
Successful motion to call on federal authorities to extend the powers of ASIC to better deal 
with property marketers and wealth creation seminars citing ASIC and ACCC actions. 
25 Sep  Council of Financial Regulators – Annual Report 2002 
‘… the exceptionally fast increase in borrowing for investor housing has clearly increased 
risk and that the accompanying rapid expansion in apartment building shows all the signs of a 
seriously over-extended market.’ p 19 
7 Oct  ASIC – Media Release: ASIC Commences New Proceedings against Henry Kaye and 
National Investment Institute 
Investigations into the operations of Henry Kaye and others for breach of prior undertaking. 43
Date Event/Description 
9 Oct  APRA – Speech – J Laker: The Resilience of Housing Loan Portfolios – APRA’s ‘Stress 
Test’ Results 
‘Over the past seven years, it would seem, housing loan default rates have become uncoupled 
from growth in housing credit. The likely explanation is that the rapid increase in housing 
prices over the period has enabled any troubled borrowers to exit the market without 
incurring losses.’ 
‘When reality inevitably intrudes, however, the earlier linkages between housing credit 
growth and loan defaults might reassert themselves.’ 
1 Nov  APRA – Discussion Paper: Proposed Changes to the Risk-weighting of Residential 
Mortgage Lending 
‘APRA is concerned that the current risk-weightings on loans for which the borrowers’ 
servicing ability is not verified do not adequately reflect the likelihood of increased risk.’ p 3
5 Nov  RBA – Media release after policy tightening 
‘Credit outstanding is rising at around 14 per cent per year, and at over 20 per cent to 
households. That is a much faster rate of growth than can be expected to be consistent with 
economic stability over the longer run.’ 
‘The strength of demand for credit increases the danger associated with delaying a tightening 
of policy that is called for on general macroeconomic grounds.’ 
10 Nov  RBA – SMP 
‘Those risks [associated with the rapid run-up in household debt], discussed at length on 
other occasions and so not repeated here, appear to be growing. Monetary policy should, as 
far as possible, avoid adding to them.’ p 3
14 Nov  RBA – Submission to the Productivity Commission Inquiry on First Home Ownership 
‘This more favourable treatment has played a role in investors being prepared to accept rental 
yields that are lower than those seen in other countries. While taxation arrangements are not 
the source of the current speculative activity in the housing market, they may affect the price 
dynamics once the attractiveness of investing in housing has improved for other reasons.’ 
p 5444
Date Event/Description 
20 Nov  RBA – Bulletin: Asset Prices and Monetary Policy 
‘In particular, the risk of a substantial asset-price correction may be sufficiently low or hard 
to quantify as to be excluded from any central forecast, particularly at a horizon of only one 
or two years. But that does not mean that it can be ignored. Rather, these considerations 
highlight the need for monetary policy to maintain a medium-term perspective …’ pp 53–54 
25 Nov  ASIC – Media Release: Receiver and Administrator Appointed to Henry Kaye Companies 
Receiver and administrator appointed to Henry Kaye companies. 
3 Dec  RBA – Media release after policy tightening 
Despite some signs of a change in sentiment in the housing market: 
‘Monetary policy is continuing to have a stimulatory effect on the economy through domestic 
credit expansion. The growth of credit remains rapid and indeed has picked up further in the 
past few months’. 
8 Dec  RBA – Governor – Testimony to House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Economics, Finance and Public Administration 
‘It is clear that, despite our best endeavours to explain ourselves, a number of people think 
that the bank tightened monetary policy to cool down the property market … However, such 
an approach would not be consistent with the truth. For a start, signs of overheating in the 
housing market were clearly evident through the second half of 2002 and all through 2003, 
yet the bank did not change monetary policy. It was only when it became clear that good 
economic growth had returned both globally and domestically that rates were raised.’ 
2004
9 Feb  RBA – SMP 
‘While this [the rapid run-up in household debt] was not the principal driver of policy, it did 
argue for avoiding undue delay when a case for moving to a less expansionary setting 
emerged on broader macroeconomic grounds.’ p 3 45
Date Event/Description 
17 Feb  RBA – Speech – Deputy Governor: Recent Issues for the Conduct of Monetary Policy 
‘… it is increasingly clear that a narrow policy focus confined to the product of conventional 
economic analysis over a one to two year horizon can miss very important developments in 
the financial sector and asset markets, which often play out over longer horizons but which 
can have major economic implications … 
So where does this leave us? I believe it should leave us trying to think about outcomes and 
risks, and policy settings which seek to manage those risks, over a horizon a bit longer than is 
common in much discussion of economic policy. Is this a departure from our long-established 
medium-term, flexible approach to inflation targeting? Definitely not. In fact, it dovetails 
quite well with the long-held view that policy should not respond solely to the inflation 
forecast at some fixed horizon and ignore other considerations. All that is new is that there is 
an additional dimension to the general rationale to maintain, and on occasion to use, the 
flexibility the system has always had.’ 
6 Apr  NSW Govt – 2004 mini-budget announcing Vendor Duty 
NSW Government presented a mini-budget which included changes to land tax and the 
imposition of a vendor duty on investment properties. 
7 May  RBA – SMP 
‘With the heat now coming out of the credit and housing markets, this risk [of a damaging 
correction] has diminished over recent months. Housing finance approvals … [are] still a[t] 
very high level[s] and will need to fall much further to bring the growth of housing credit 
back to a reasonably sustainable pace.’ p 3 
‘While this factor [the overheating housing market] was not the principal driver of policy, it 
had been an important reason to avoid unnecessary delay in moving the cash rate back up to a 
more normal position.’ p 3 
2 Jun  RBA – Speech – Deputy Governor: Economic Conditions and Prospects: June 2004 
‘… we have been worried about the housing market as an asset market, and about the 
borrowing behaviour of participants in that market. The concern was not out of a desire to 
target house prices, but more over the potential risks to macroeconomic stability from a 
major boom – and possible bust – in the household sector’s main asset class.’ 46
Date Event/Description 
4 Jun  RBA – Governor – Testimony to House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Economics, Finance and Public Administration 
‘As the fall in prices becomes widely known, it should allow potential house purchasers to 
take their time … It should also enable them to resist the blandishments of the banks, brokers 
and other commission agents plying them with offers of seemingly generous quantities of 
credit. It should also reinforce the recent tendency of investors to question the assumption 
about easy capital gains.’ 
‘When the public recognise that prices are going down rather than up—as they are 
recognising because they are reading it more and more in the papers—I think it should affect 
their behaviour.’ 
1 Jul  NSW Govt – Vendor duty came into effect 
Introduction of 2.25 per cent vendor duty on the sale price of investment property when the 
sale price exceeds the purchase price by more than 12 per cent.  
19 Jul  ACCC – Action against Vision Pursuit for deceptive conduct 
Action against Vision Pursuit for misleading or deceptive conduct in promotion of property 
investment. 
9 Aug  RBA – SMP 
‘The overheating in the housing market last year carried the potential to destabilise the 
broader economy, the more so the longer it continued.’ p 3 
‘There has also been an easing in the demand for housing finance, particularly from investors, 
though this will need to adjust further if the growth of housing credit is to return to a 
reasonably sustainable pace.’ p 3
8 Nov  RBA – SMP 
‘The adjustment to date has been an orderly one, so that the risk of an uncomfortably sharp 
decline in house prices does not appear to be large, though equally there does not appear 
much risk of a renewed upsurge at present.’ p 3 
2005
2 Aug  NSW Govt – Vendor duty abolished 
Vendor duty abolished 47
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